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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

LIQrOR CONTROL
OF UTAH,

CO~IMI8SION

Plaitntijf,
NE'V YORK CASUALTY COMpANY, a corporation,
Intervenor,

Case No.
7738

vs.
C. V. LACK and CHRIS E. ATHAS,
Defendants.

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
SUPPORTING BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
C. E. ATHAS

Comes now the respondent, Chris E. Athas, and
respectfully prays for the Court to grant a rehearing
in this cause for the following plain, serious and fundamental errors of both ommission and commission :
1
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This decision is the second by this Court on this
appeal. The first decision was on respondent's motion to
dismiss the appeal. Point I relates to the matter of a
more definite statement, and Point II to the failure to
state a claim.

I.
THE OPINION FIRST UPHOLDS THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION GRANTING RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT,
AND THEN ERRONEOUSLY NULLIFIES THIS AFFIRMANCE BY ASSUMPTIONS WHICH ARE
WRONG IN F'ACT AND LAW, AND ARE CONTRARY TO THIS COURT'S PRIOR DECISION
HEREIN.
A. The Trial Court's decision and judgment of dismissal were after refusal to furnish a more definite
statement, and are dispositive of this case under Rule
12( e).
B. The affirmance here of the correctness of the
Trial Court's decision necessarily ends this case, for:
1.

Rule 12( e) was properly applied.

2. Our motion here to dismiss this appeal
squarely raised the question as to whether on appellant's
refusal to plead a more definite statement the case had
been finally dismissed, on that ground. If not, the appeal
would have had to be dismissed.
· 3. On that motion, the appellant contended
it had been so dismissed and asked the Court to permit
2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

it to an1end the order dis1nissing and its notice of appeal
so as to make certain both its waiver of any right to
amend, and also the final dis1nissal on. this ground.
This Court, by allowing this amendment
and denying our Inotion to dis1niss the appeal necessarily,
and in fact, held :
4.

a. That appellant, by refusal to furnish
the more definite statmnent when ordered, had so waived,
and final dis1nissal had properly followed.
b. Also that the case should proceed by
appeal to decision upon the merits, on this ground; as it
did.
5. Thus appellant's waiver, under Rule 12 (e),
and this Court's first decision based thereon, and the
opinion now affirming the judgment of the Trial Court
must end this case.
C. The revival and sending of the case back for any
further procedure on this complaint is therefore wrong,
and the two off-hand assumptions indulged in the opinion have no place in the case at all, and are erroneous and
confusing.
The first of these assumptions is that both the motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and that for
a more definite statement, "cannot consistently be
granted." This is erroneous and can have no effect here,
for:
1. The reasons just stated under 1-B, supra.
2. This Court had herein previously held contrary to this.
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3. Appellant has waived herein the benefit of
any such additional claim, and any right to have a reversal of the dismissal judgment, except on the merits
as raised below and here, and neither party has raised
or had a chance to be heard on this.
4. This Court has accepted and acted upon appellant's said waiver.
5.

It is contrary to the Rules of Civil Pro-

6.

It is bad in law.

cedure.

The second erroneous assumption stated in the opinion is: "We presume that appellant's election to stand
upon its compliant was based primarily upon the ruling
of the Trial Court, that the complaint did not state a
claim.... " This, likewise, is entirely wrong, and is not
available for the above and these additional reasons:
1.

It is contrary to the repeated assertions of

its position by appellant, itself, herein, and on which
it was able to sustain its appeal.
2.

It is inconsistent with and contrary to the

basis upon which this Court allowed appellant to make
the amendments on appeal heretofore referred to, and
upon which our motion to dismiss the appeal was denied.
3. It has no basis in the record, but is plainly
contrary thereto, and appellant has made no such claim,
and respondent has had no chance to be heard on such.

4
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IT.
AS TO RESPONDENT'S :MOTION TO DISMISS
FOR FAILURE TO STATE..:\ CLAil\f, THE COURT
HAS, WE BELIEVE, SERIOUSLY ERRED BY ASSERTING FOR APPELLANT A THEORY OF LIABILITY NOT PLEADED AND NOT CLAIMED, AND
ALSO IX IGNORIXG THE ISSUES ACTUALLY
FR~-\.~IED AXD PRESENTED ON THE APPEAL.
This appears, because :
1. The recital of the opinion that the complaint
states a clain1 of conversion of liquor by act of this respondent raises a purely moot issue.

2. There is no such allegation as a conclusion,
or otherwise.

3. The appellant, in its complaint and brief,
has asserted a factual basis and theory of liability entirely different from this.
4. Appellant has plainly indicated by its
briefs, here and in the Court below, that it did not intend
or want to allege such theory of liability; it plainly has
refused to amend to so allege.

5. The decision ignores the briefs of both parties, and the issues therein supported and upon which
the parties seek decision herein, namely:
a. Does respondent's partnership relationship with Lack, under facts as alleged by appellant,
render respondent liable for delicts and failure to account
by Lack1

5
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b. And, where a complaint alleges facts
which state a theory of conversion and liability, can a
mere conclusion of conversion, if one appears, be given
a different effect, or any effect~
c. Note that, if the Court had considered
these two legal points and the authorities as briefed in
support thereof, the Court would not have fallen into this
error, and the parties would not have a different and
unwanted law suit imposed upon them.
BRIEF AND ARGUMENT
The petition is quite in detail. We hope by this to
make our position clearer, avoid explanation, and also,
call attention to the rules of law and procedure relied
upon.
Most of the rules are so well understood and uniformly applied that they need not be supported by citation of authority.
Some reference to the record here on the motion to
dismiss the appeal, as well as to the record and briefs
on the appeal, are necessary to correct some serious misunderstandings.

I.
THE OPINION FIRST UPHOLDS THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION GRANTING RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT,
AND THEN ERRONEOUSLY NULLIFIES THIS AFFIRMANCE BY ASSUMPTIONS WHICH ARE

6
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"\YRON"G IN F~-\CT AND LA "\V, AND ARE CONTRARY TO THIS COURT'S PRIOR DECISION
HEREIN.

I- A and B
In first discussing what we believe is the conclusive
effect of sustaining the order dismissing the complaint
after refusal to furnish a nwre definite statement, we
rely on the evident and controlling proposition, that:
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL
'VHEN AFFIR:JIED ON APPEAL ENDS THE CASE.
The contrary detennination here is because basic
factors, of law and of fact, have been overlooked.
To plaintiff's complaint (R. 1), this respondent directed two motions (R. 16), one under Civil Rule 12(b),
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and one under
Rule 12(e), for a more definite statement.
On Jan. 31, 1951 ( R. 20), the Trial Court separately
sustained each of these motions (R. 20) and gave the
plaintiff ten days in which to amend. On Aug. 1, 1951 (R.
21), the appellant filed its Notice of "Election To Stand
On Original Complaint," stating that it "hereby elects to
stand upon its original complaint as against defendant
Chris E. Athas and take judgment ... as regards said
defendant."
On Aug. 1, 1951, appellant moved the Court (R. 24)
for, and on Aug. 7, prepared and got a judgment of dismissal. This order again recited that appellant had

7
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"elected to stand upon its original complaint." On this
same day it filed its Notice of Appeal (R. 23), and pursuant thereto the record was filed in this Court.

Proceedings on Motion To Dismiss Appeal:
We cite now some material proceedings here in this
Court on our motion filed Oct. 19, 1951, to dismiss the
appeal, because the decisions of the Court, based on the
position on both sides then taken, is entirely inconsistent
with the opinion now. This Court's record can be cited
only by dates of documents.
From the wording of the Order of Dismissal and
the Notice of Appeal (R. 22, 23) just mentioned, it was
not clear that appellant intended to appeal from the effect
of the order of the Trial Court in sustaining respondent's
motion for a more definite statement, i.e., on both motions and grounds of dismissal.
We, therefore, relied, in our motion to dismiss this
appeal, upon the principle that an appeal will be dismissed where taken only on one ground of decision, or so
that if the trial Judge were reversed on the ground appealed, the case would still stand dismissed on other
grounds. In other words, if the decision of the matter
appealed would not settle the case. On this we cited in
our memo, filed Oct. 22 and Oct. 31, 1951 :

Flourney v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253, a case directly
in point on the proposition, that if this was it the appeal
should be dismissed; and also, among additional authority, a case in the Eighth Circuit:

8
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Hunter v. Federal Life In;)urance Co., 103 F. (2) 192,
and quoted Judge Sanborn on the similar attempt there,
that "It is well settled that a case may not be brought
here by ... appeal in frag1nents ;"etc.
Hendrick;) l'. O;)man, et al, Hi-± P. 2d 545, holding that
the defendant was entitled to the benefit of his special
den1urrer based on the ground that the complaint was
"insufficient to appraise the defendants of the claim they
must meet:'' and also holding that the case was properly
and finally disposed of by dismissal upon such special
demurrer after refusal of the defendant to amend.
Bamberger, et al v. Certified Prod. Inc., 53 P. 2d
1153, at 1155 (Ut.), was also cited and we quoted this
Court that "the remedy for uncertainty or unintelligibility in a pleading lies in a special demurrer, which is
equivalent to a motion to make more certain, .. .."
Neither the appellant or the Court raised any question as to these settled principles. But, both set about to
make certain that the judgment of dismissal on this
ground of uncertainty was final, and the appeal from it
clear and definite.
In its answer to our motion filed herein Oct. 24, 1951,
the appellant, after alleging (P. 1) that the Trial Court,
on the 31st day of Jan., 1951, had granted both of appellant's motions, said:
"That plaintiff elected to stand on its complaint, took judgment against it upon the order
referred to above, and this appeal is taken from
that judgment."

9
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The order "referred to" sustained both our motions.
And on our contention that appellant, by moving
the dismissal of its own complaint had waived the right
to now appeal therefrom, appellant denied such waiver,
but, admitted it had waived its right to amend its complaint.
Appellant alleged :
"d. Referring to paragraph 4 of defendant's
(respondent's) motion, plaintiff alleges that said
motion (i.e. to dismiss its own complaint (R. 24) )
was made and filed at the same time and in connection with plaintiff's notice of election to stand
on its original complaint, that it was made for the
purpose of procuring from the court a final appealable order, and that it shows on its face and
in connection with the record herein that it does
not constitute a waiver of any right of plaintiff
herein except the right to amend its complaint."
Thus, it is admitted and asserted, as it must be, to
sustain appellant's right to appeal, that it had waived
its right to amend its complaint as to this ground; and
this is clearly the legal effect of such refusal. In other
words, a party cannot stand on his complaint and refuse
to furnish a more definite statement after being ordered
so to do, and then, after judgment of dismissal, and after
the affirmance of such judgment on appeal, still amend
and proceed on the complaint.
But further, and of equal or greater importance,
on this is the fact that the appellant, in its said answer,
and so that this Court would definitely treat the judg-
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ment of dismissal as applying to both decisions of the
Trial Court, also n1ade a motion ( P. 2) to amend,
"the judgment of dismissal as to Defendant
Athas (R. :2:2), and that the words 'and said defendant's n10tion for a more definite statement'
be added."
Having so waived right to an1end its complaint and
so applied to arnend the judg1nent thereon, then appellant supported this 1notion to amend by a brief filed
herein Oct. 26, in which its position is thus made clear
(P. 1):

"Fron1 an, examination of the record it is
obvious that plaintiff's objective is and has always been to have the order of January 31st
reviewed by this court in its entirety ... an examination of plaintiff's brief on file herein shows
that plaintiff's statement of points and argument
includes the order of the district court granting
the motion for more definite statement."

''Whether the trial court had ordered that
the complaint be stricken on one motion and dismissed on the other, or whether it ordered the
complaint dismissed on both motions is immaterial
here. The facts are, of course, that the action
was dismissed because of plaintiff's refusal to
amend on both grounds, and the appeal is based
on the theory that the complaint is good as regards both motions .... "
"The effect of the amendments proposed by
the plaintiff would be to indicate clearly and unequivocally that the appeal is taken to review the
order of the trial court made January 31, 1951,
on both the motion to dismiss and the motion for
a more definite statement. (R. 20)"
11
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So that when this Court, on this record, December
3, 1951, entered its order that appellant's motion for permission to amend "was granted," and on the same day
entered its order that respondent's motion to dismiss
appeal "was denied," it necessarily decided and settled
in this case, that :
Rule 12(e) was properly applied and this case was,
by the Trial Court, appropriately dismissed thereunder.
That the Court below not only could, but did, grant
both motions, and that the case had been finally dismissed
by orders applying to both.
That the appeal was from the order of dismissal
as to each motion, and that it should proceed on the
merits of the Court's decision as to each.
That appellant, by refusal to furnish the more definite statement when ordered by the Trial Court, had
waived its right "to amend the complaint," as it said it
had_, otherwise, the action below would not be final.
Also that the "effect of the amendment proposed"
was "to indicate clearly and unequivocally that the appeal
is taken to review the order of the Trial Court on • • • the
motion for a more definite statement."
How can this Court now say it couldn't be. or wasn't
so appealed?

Decision Upon the Merits :
The writer of the opinion here, we believe, was not
on the Court when the foregoing record and decision were
made here, and probably was not familiar with them.

12
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However, the opinion does seem to consider that the
Trial Court's decision upon the Inotion for a more definite state1uent was thus appealed on the merits and it
affirn1s that decision. It ~:my8 that certain of the allegations "Lead to confusion and ambiguity both in legal
theory and fact," and "we believe the instant case clearly
to be one where the nwtion was properly made and
granted." So that both motions were considered on their
merits and the decision of the Trial Court on this motion
was approved and upheld.
This, we think, ended this case just as effectively in
every respect as if the granting of the first motion, to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, had been approved
and affirmed by this Court. There is no reason why these
final orders of dismissal as to these motions stood upon
any different basis.
It is true that there was no necessity for this Court
deciding as to the Trial Court's ruling upon both of them,
because the decision that the order of dismissal based on
either was correct, would necessarily dispose of the case.
The authorities cited infra, show that when two motions of the character of these are presented to an Appellate Court, it may, and often does, dispose of the case,
affirming the Trial Court on the special demurrer or on
this kind of motion. And it appears that such affirmance
does and must dispose of the case.
3 Am. J ur ., Page 677
"1166. Eff'ect of Affirmance. It may be
stated generally that a judgment of affirmance is

13
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a determination by the appellate court that the
proceeding under review is free from prejudicial
error. Such action ends the case in the appellate
court and deprives such court of all power to add
to, or alter, the record as certified, by rescinding
the order of affirmance and dismissing the appeal.
All questions raised by the assignments of error
and all questions that might have been so raised
are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against
the appellant or plaintiff in error, and the judgment affirmed must be regarded as free from all
error."
Decisions in support of this rule are necessarily those
in review of lower or intermediate Courts. Because, if
the highest Courts choose to disregard the rules, opinions are not generally written in correction of that.
However, in the next case, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals did reverse itself, and this was
approved by the Supreme Court. It is the same rule applied in any court, when a judgment has become really
final.

In Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery, 284 U.S.
547, 76 L. Ed. 476, the rule is fully discussed.
Respondent obtained a judgment in the Trial Court
for breach of contract of employment and an appeal to
the Circuit Court resulted in affirmance. But, in the
meantime, appellant on the basis of newly discovered
evidence applied to the Circuit Court to send the case
back to the trial Court. So that the order of the Circuit Court also permitted .the Trial Court to so proceed
to hear this.
14
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After further proceedings in the Trial Court, there
was a second appeal to the Circuit Court. It then decided
that having affirn1ed the judgment of the Trial Court
previously, it could not send the case back, as it did, to
the Trial Court for further proceedings.
Justice Roberts, in an opinion sustaining the Circuit
Court on thi~, cites the statute by which the Supreme
Court and also the Circuit Court of Appeals exercise
authority on appeals, and like Rule 76(a) of our Crvil
Rules, they have the authority to "reverse, affirm, or
modify.'' In addition to this the authority of these Federal Courts, on remand, is broader than the authority
of this Court under Rule 76(a). However, on affirmance,
the rule is the same. And after stating the facts, the
opinion says : (479)
"But the claim is that Sec. 701 of the Revised Statutes, U.S.C. title 28, Sec. 876, which defines our appellate jurisdiction, and is made applicable to the Circuit Courts of Appeal * * •
authorizes these Courts * * * to set aside a judgment and receive additional evidence, if justice
so requires, and that such power may also be exercised by remanding the cause to the trial court
for similar proceedings.

• • • •
"Stress is placed upon the point that in addition to mere power to affirm, reverse or modify,
jurisdiction is given in the alternative to order
such judgment to be rendered or such further
proceedings to be had by the inferior court as the
justice of the case may require * * * though there
be no error upon the face of the record the section

l5
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authorizes its return to the lower court for the
opening of the judgment and reception of newly
discovered evidence * * *.

• • • •
"The section has been construed as applying
to cases where a judgment or decree is affirmed
upon appeal and further proceedings in the'court
below are appropriate in aid of the relief granted.
And the statute warrants the giving of directions
by an appellate court for further proceedings below in conformity with a modification or a reversal of a judgment where, in consequence of
such action, such proceedings should be had * • *.

...

...

"Nothing was there said to indicate that this
court would order further proceedings below to
attack or set aside a judgment entered on a record
which disclosed no error calling for a modification
or reversal. No authority is cited in which Rev.
Stat. S.ec. 701, U.S.C. title 28, Sec. 876, has been
construed as extending this court's powers in
the manner for which petitioner contends • • •.
"In the present case there is a further conclusive reason why the remission of the cause to
the District Court was ineffective to give authority to hear the motion to set aside the judgment.
Upon the original appeal the Circuit Court of
Appeals found no error in the record and affirmed
the judgment • • *.
"The attempt by remanding the record with
leav·e to the court below to take action which would
otherwise have been beyond its powers left the
matter precisely as if no such order had been
made."
Edwards v. Hoevet, (Or.) 200 P. 2d, 955.

16
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This is a more recent case cited under the above
quotation from A.M. JUR. In it the Trial Court entered
a judgment granting defendant's motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict of the jury. And then also
granted a new trial. The case went to the Supreme Court
of Oregon which approved the judgment, and the opinion
by Chief Justice Rossn1an after disposing of this affirmance, considered the order granting a new trial, and said:
(962)
"We believe that under the circumstances the
award of a new trial should be deemed nothing
more than a statement of the trial judge's appraisal of the record. It was entirely proper to
make the award, but since the judgment, which
was entered notwithstanding the verdict, must be
affirmed, the award of the new trial becomes
functus officio.
Rapalje and Lawrence's Law Dictionary, Vol. I
"FUNCTUS OFFICIO. An expression applied to an agent or donee of an authority who
has performed the act authorized, so that the authority is exhausted and at an end."
So it would seem that when this Court had affirmed
the final judgment of dismissal, there was nothing further to be done in the Trial Court. It was as if there had
been no appeal taken.
Erroneous Revival of Case:
We refer the Court to this section 1-C of the motion
for a statement of the assumptions now referred to.
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Notwithstanding, the disposition of the motion to
dismiss the appeal in this case on this clear record that
the appellant's "objective is and always has been * • *
to indicate clearly and unequivocally that the appeal is
taken to review the order on both the motion to dismiss
and for a more definite statement." The opinion now
says that the appellant's election to stand on its complaint was not based on the Trial Court's decision on this
latter matter, but "primarily" on the other ground. A
presumption could be no more erroneous, or out of place.
We also attempted to "presume" that the appeal was
based on the other motion, and tried to get it dismissed
on that presumption, and we were promptly challenged
by the appellant, and then corrected by this Court.
And, when this Court entered its order based on the
foregoing record, it necessarily recognized the right of
the Trial Court to rule on and grant both these motions,
and the necessity and propriety of the appeal on both.
This opinion now seems to reverse this, in saying, "both
motions cannot consistently be granted." Because it
is very obvious that this Court, in granting appellant's
amendment and denying our motion to dismiss the appeal, was not then of the opinion that "both motions
cannot consistently be granted." If so, it would have
made quick disposition of our motion to dismiss the appeal.
Unless this statement in the opinion and the intent of
the Court as to the effect of this are here clarified, both
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the Trial Court in this case, and the bench and bar in
every case involving Rule 12, will be in hopeless confusion.
How can the Trial Court proceed' Is it to assume
that because it may han_~ not acted "consistently" it didn't
act at all on this matter 1 Also, that this Court, in affirming this judgment of dismissal, didn't 3:ct at all~ This
statement, if taken as the decision in this case, certainly
· will change the established practice, and we believe it
is plainly contrary to intent of Rule 12, itself.
This rule not only permits, but requires, that these
two motions, if n1ade, be made together or the right to
make one is waived.
2 Moore's Federal Practice, (2d Edition) Section
12.19:
"If any other motion under Rule 12 is made
before serving a responsive pleading, the motion
for a more definite statement must be consolidated
with it or it is waived."
This Rule so applies, not only to these two motions,
but to all of the motions provided under (b), (c) and (e)
of the Rule, and (g) says that he must make all "objections then available to hirn which this Rule permits to be
raised by motion" and unless he does so "he shall not
thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses."
There are two exceptions, but neither o.f these affects
the motion under consideration now.
There are, in (b), (c) and (e) of this Rule, nine different motions that could all be available, and if relied
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upon, all must be made in the one motion, and seven of
them would be waived if not included in the one motion.
The rule of procedure indicated by this statementin
the opinion here, would appear to make it erroneous for
the Court, in then acting upon the motion so consolidated, to grant n10re than one of these motions at a time
because each of them, if granted, would dispose of the
case. For exmnple, the ruling on one, "lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter," would then dispose of the
case. And in the language of the opinion, it is only when
the Court has jurisdiction, "that a (any) motion under
Rule 12-e (or 12-b) can be properly considered."
So the question now is whether the Court should rule
on as many of these as are made, so that one order, and
one appeal, would enable the Appellate Court to dispose
of all the defenses raised by motion, or whether the Trial
Court should simply rule upon one, because if it should
grant that one "no responsive pleading is required and
any further attack upon the pleading is useless." We
have shown supra, in reviewing our motion to dismiss
the appeal, that an Appellate Court would not hear such
appeal, because it may not settle the case.
And, there is no difference in ranking here as between the n1otion for a more definite statement and any
of the other motions, so far as disposing of the case is
concerned. In fact, 12 (e) makes the disposition of the
case mandatory if the order for a more definite statement
"is not obeyed within ten days." On this, the parties have
agreed here. So that there is absolutely no difference,
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as we have already indicated, between this Court's refusing to dispose of this case upon affirming the judgment
as to this motion, and its so refusing to dispose of the
case if it had affirmed the Trial Court on the other motion, for failure to state a claim.
We believe this staten1ent in the opinion will introduce a new systmn of successive appeals, contrary to the
intent of Rule 12. No authority is cited in the opinion in
support of the staten1ent, and we can find none.
It is plainly contrary to the rules and practice of
this Court to inject these assumptions into this case and
then give them the full effect of reversing the case.
No such matters were presented to the Trial Court.
Appellant has made no such claim or contention.
These are contrary to the claims that appellant did
make in this Court.
They are contrary to the position this Court took in
its first decision herein.
We never have had a chance to defend as to either
of these.
In Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, et al, 242 P. 2d 297 (Mar.
25, 1952), this Court has ruled squarely that it would not
consider such things, even if claimed on appeal, because,
"We feel constrained not to review those
matters which plaintiff cannot defend against because not called to attention by her opponents."
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The only consistent conclusion on the entire record
is that appellant did not want to, and would not amend,
to make the complaint more certain, because they have
continued to claim that the one theory they relied upon
and wanted to plead was sufficiently clear. This was a
partnership liability theory.
Why can't the parties choose their own theories of
claim and defense in this case, like any other case 1
3

Am. Jur., P. 372:
830: "Limitation to Theory Presented Below. The well-settled rule which requires the
parties to adhere on appeal to the theory upon
which they presented the case in the trial court operates to limit the scope of the review, since the
authorities are agreed on the proposition that the
case, on appeal, must be reviewed and decided on
the theory on which it was tried in the court below, and that the theory upon which the case was
submitted in the trial court should be treated as
the law of the case on appeal.

* * * •
831 : "The reviewing court will treat the
pleadings as the parties elected to treat them in
the court below and will adhere to the construction given them by the trial court."

Affirmance of Judgment of Dismissal Ends Case:
We cite now some additional authorities on this axiomatic proposition, and also holding that the two motions should be presented together and decided together,
as the rule indicates.
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The law has been so firn1ly settled on this in decisions dealing with general and special demurrers, that
apparently few cases haYe been presented under the later
Rules where these objections are taken by motions.
In Bamberger, et al, c. Certified Productions, Inc.,
53 P. 2d at1155 (rtah 1936), this Court said:
"Ordinarily the remedy for uncertainty or
unintelligibility in a pleading lies in a ·special
demurrer which is equivalent to a motion to make
more certain, and not in a motion to strike."
See also, State v. Rolio, 262 P. 987 (Ut. 1927).
1 Bancroft, Code Pleading Practice and Remedies
(1937 Ed.)
"Section 207 (Ambiguity, Unintelligibility
and Uncertainty). In General. In some jurisdictions the objection that a pleading is ambiguous,
unintelligibile, or uncertain, is one to be taken by
special demurrer, not by a motion to strike. The
demurrer is equivalent to a motion to make more
certain."

Herman v. Mutttal Life Insurance Co. of N. Y., 108
F. (2) 678, 682 (C.A. 3rd 1939), cited at Page 54 of our
original brief, seems to be a case where the propriety of
deciding both motions together was assumed. The lower
Court sustained a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim. The upper Court affirmed after discussing in
elaborate detail several possible or conceivable claims
suggested by the complaint. The Court said at the end
of the opinion :
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"In conclusion we might call counsel's attention to Rule 12 (e) of the new Rules. We have
been constrained to attempt a rather elaborate
opinion largely because the complaint seemed capable of varied interpretations. A resort to Rule
12 (e) would, by definition, have resulted in the
necessary certainty."
Thus the Court intimates that it would have been
proper for the Court below to have sustained a motion
for a more definite statement also.

Hendricks v. Osman, et al, (Cal.) 164 P. 2d 545
(1946), supra. This case is almost identical with the
case at bar. To the complaint the defendants filed a
general demurrer charging that it "failed to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action," and also a
special demurrer charging that the complaint "was uncertain and unintelligible in certain alleged particulars."
The Trial Court sustained both these demurrers and gave
Plaintiff ten days to amend. Plaintiff elected to stand
upon his complaint rather than amend. The Court sustained the ruling of the Trial Court on the special demurrer and thereupon affinned the judgment. The opinion (546) says:
"It is clearly the law that one who declines
to avail himself of leave to amend his complaint
after a demurrer thereto has been sustained,
which demurrer is both general and special, thereby must stand upon his pleading as against both
grounds of demurrer, and if the complaint is
objectionable on any ground the judgment of dismissal must be affirmed."
24
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Powell r. Lampton, 85 P.

~d

495, 496 (Cal. App.
1938). The lower court entered a judg1nent of dismissal
rendered after a general and special den1urrer were interposed, the special was sustained for uncertainty. The
upper Court affinned holding·, "The dmnurrer was properly sustained. The allegations of the complaint are
clearly uncertain." The case stood dismissed.
California Trust Co. v. Cohn, 7 P. 2d 297 (Calif.
1932). This is an appeal by the defendants from a judg-

ment of dismissal entered when a demurrer to their
second amended cross-complaint was sustained. The defendants were given leave to amend and refused to do
so. The Court stated the rule as follows:
"A plaintiff, or cross-complainant, who declines to avail himself of leave to amend his pleading after a demurrer thereto is sustained, which
demurrer is both general and special, must stand
upon his pleading as against both grounds of
demurrer."
Aalwyn v. Cobe, 142 P. 79 (Calif. 1914). The lower
Court sustained a general and special demurrer to the
complaint. The complaint was su~sequently dismissed.
The ground for special demurrer was that the complaint
was "uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible." The
Court held:
"For this uncertainty and the ambiguity of
the allegations, the special demurrer was properly
sustained."
Also,
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"A plaintiff who has declined to amend his
complaint after a demurrer sustained, which is
both general and special, must stand upon his
pleading as against both grounds of demurrer."

Martinovich v. Wooley, 60 P. 760 (Calif.1900). To
the complaint of plaintiff a general and special demurrer
was interposed. The demurrer was sustained, and plaintiff, declining to amend, appealed from the order of dismissal subsequently entered. The Court affirmed, saying:
"Plaintiff, having declined to amend, must
stand upon his pleading."

Winchell v. Strawbridge, 266 P. 539. An appeal from
a judgment for defendants, based upon an order sustaining both general and special demurrers to the amended
complaint, plaintiff having declined to amend the complaint. The court affirmed holding that "numerous
grounds of uncertainty and ambiguity exist in the pleading."
Rule 12 (e) directly requires dismissal for refusal
to amend here, and the most serious effect of the opinion
is that IT COMPLETELY NULLIFIES RULE 12(e).
II.
AS TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, THE COURT HAS, WE
BELIEVE, SERIOUSLY ERRED BY ASSERTING FOR
APPELLANT A THEORY OF LIABILITY NOT PLEADED
AND NOT CLAIMED, AND ALSO IN IGNORING THE
ISSUES ACTUALLY FRAMED AND PRESENTED ON THE
APPEAL.
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On this division, we again refer the Court to II
of the 1notion for a full staten1ent of our position, as now
discussed.
The principal error as we see it here is that the
Court has asserted a theory of liability that is neither
alleged, claiined, or relied upon, and has refused to
decide the issue alleged and presented.
The Court's Theory of Liability:
The opinion states that a "conclusion of conversion"
by respondent is alleged. That the appellant has done
this "by alleging in substance a conversion by both defendants after delivery of the liquor to a single defendant, Lack, * * *" We pointed out in our brief (P. 13,
22-27) that we found in the complaint no allegation of
conversion of liquor at all, and particularly no allegation of any possession or handling or conversion of liquor
by respondent at all. Appellant did not question this
or assert that there was such. It asserted a completely
different factual theory. So this· seems to end the
Court's conclusion theory, so far as the parties are concerned.
And, the complaint doesn't say, as asserted in the
last line, second paragraph of the opinion, that "defendants failed to account and have converted," etc.
What it alleges is the delivery of a million dollars
worth of liquor to "the possession of" Lack, its agent,
for purpose of sale as agreed. It then alleges its sale,
and then says that for part of the liquor sold, "defendants failed * * * to account * * * and that, THERE-
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FORE, (i.e. "for that reason, because of that, on that
ground") the * * * defendants wrongfully converted the
value thereof." This is different from saying that they
failed to account for the value "and" also that they converted.
But, 1n any event, both parties here have tried to
convince the Court that the appellant didn't attempt
or want to allege that respondent, himself, personally
ever possessed or converted any liquor. If appellant had
wanted to plead that, it certainly would have done so.
The Rules provided a form, Rule 84, Form 11, Page 165,
whereby this could have been alleged in twenty-five
words.
So that the theory of liability asserted in this opinion is imposed upon the parties here without claim or
support by appellant, or chance for defense by respondent.

Appellant's Real Claim of Liability:
And there should be no confusion or doubt as to
appellant's sole theory of liability against respondent.
It is presented by elaborate allegations of contract relationship between Lack and the appellant to operate a
package agency, and also allegations of Lack's partnership with respondent in the conduct of a pharmacy in
the same premises on which the liquor agency was operated. Then the allegations of the delivery there of a
million dollars worth of liquor, to the possession of
Lack for sale, and then the sale and failure to account
for part of this.
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From these, appellant claitned conversion by Lack,
and then liability for his acts, on the part of respondent,
because of this related partnership business. Cases and
authorities were cited upon this theory of partnership
liability, and none on any other theory.
And again we c01nnwnted that apparently no other
theory of conversion was intended to be pleaded and
presented (P. 28), also reasons and some authorities
to sho'v that none other was actually pleaded. Appellant
made no contrary clai1n as to this. On the contrary, in
its brief it especially e1nphasized that this was its sole
theory. Thus it said (P. 5):
·• 'The theory of plaintiff is that where a
conversion occurs in the course of operation of
a partnership, each partner may be held liable
* * * regardless of knowledge * * *.' And, again
(P. 6): 'Plaintiff's position is * * * if one partner
converted a portion thereof, then all partners
may be held * * *'; and (P. 6) : 'This theory is
fundamental to plaintiff's position so far as defendant Athas is concerned.'"
The appellant's position could hardly be clearer.
Its persistence in claiming this was its theory, and that
it was sufficiently pleaded, and its refusal to amend
below and throughout the proceedings on the motion to
dismiss the appeal, was repeated on the argument on
the appeal. So it is difficult for us to understand the
reluctance on the part of this Court, in this case, to
believe that the parties know what they want to plead
and present here.

29
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

There are particular reasons in this case why the
respondents didn't, and would not want to, plead the
theory suggested by the Court and would insist upon
their theory as we pointed out in our brief (P. 29). The
facts of this loss had all been developed through two
long trials and presented before the judges of this Court,
establishing that the loss was not due to acts of respondent. But, this nevertheless left open and did not conflict
with the possibility of partnership liability which the
appellants presented and wanted to have decided.
Issues Presented By the Parties Ignored:
So that the parties here on both sides extensively
briefed and argued this partnership theory of liability,
and yet it is not even adverted to in the opinion. In
fact, there was only one other legal question that was
briefed at all, and it was not contested by appellants.
This has very little materiality now, but we advert
to it briefly because of a misunderstanding in the opinion
on it.
The opinion says that our principal contention is
"that the conclusion of conversation by Athas is nullified by the specific facts alleged." There may be some
basis for this misconception in our brief, but it misses
the actual point of our contention.
We have never thought, or contended that any conclusion of conversion by respondent Athas was alleged,
so we have never tried to nullify that. We did contend
in our brief (P. 22-27) that the language quoted above,
that defendants had refused "to account, and that, ther-e-
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fore, • • • had converted the value thereof" was not an
allegation of conversion at all, as it plainly isn't.

'Ve also contended and cited this authority for the
proposition that where facts were alleged and asserted
as constituting a conversion, that no different theory of
conversion could be based on the mere use of the word
"converted" or "conversion."
We still think the law cited is good sound law, which
makes appellant's theory of vicarious partnership liability the only one available here. It also limits the
language above quoted, in which the term "converted"
was used, to the basis pleaded.
We come again to the application of the law quoted
hereinabove, on "Limitation to the Theory Presented
below" as applied by this and other appellate courts.
And we come also to the application of the principle
that Appellate Courts will not decide, or even enter into,
matters which have not been raised and presented.
3 .Am. Jur. 361:

"820. Limitation to Matters Presented to,
and Passed upon by, the Lower Court. An appellate court will decline to enter upon a discussion
of questions which have not arisen in the case
and probably never will arise. It will not, ordinarily, consider matters which were not presented
to the trial court or passed upon therein, even for
the purpose of advising the trial court of the
action it ought to take on their being subsequently
presented for consideration."
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This Court not only in Lepasotis v. Dinsdale, 242
P. 2d 297, supra, but in about a hundred other cases,
has said, in different ways, that it would not consider
or review claims which opposing parties had not had
the opportunity, or "cannot defend against," or which
were not by proper assignment or statement of error
presented.
We do not repeat the authorities cited at our brief
(P. 22-27) but we think there is no escape here from
the rule there supported, that:
"Where a pleading contains both general
and specific averments * * * a conclusion and
also the facts from which it is drawn, * * *
the specific averments or special facts are controlling, and the general allegations will be disregarded as immaterial."
CONCLUSION
We have shown, we believe, that the opinion does
not follow the Rules.
That the failure to hold that affirmance of the Trial
Court's decision and the judgment of dismissal after
refusal to amend, pursuant to Rule 12 (e), ends this case,
is a complete nullification of that Rule.
The opinion on this point also by the statement that
the Trial Court could not consistently decide this motion
sets up a rule of practice as to all motions covered by
Rule 12, which appears to be contrary thereto, and is
clearly contrary to the settled law as heretofore applied.
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The other state1nent as to appellant's lack of reliance on its appeal on this ground is wrong by the record
above quoted.
As to Division II of our motion, the opinion seems
to us to impose an unwanted theory of liability, and
that this theory is contrary to the factual claim asserted
by appellant, and is, therefore, contrary to the law
applicable here.
Wherefore, respondent respectfully asks that his
petition for a rehearing be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
MULLINER, PRINCE & MULLINER
AND EDWARD L. MULLINER,
Attorneys for Respondent
CHRIS E. ATHAS
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